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CINDY STENGER, KIRK WELLER, ILANA ARNON, 
ED DUBINSKY, DRAGA VIDAKOVIC  
A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR 
UNDERSTANDING THE UNCOUNTABLE SET P(N) 
RESUMEN. En el presente estudio nos preguntamos si los individuos construyen estructuras 
mentales para el conjunto )(NP  que da significado a la expresión “todos los subconjuntos de N ”. 
Los aportes de nuestra investigación en relación con esta pregunta tienen dos vertientes. 
Primeramente, identificamos las perspectivas constructivistas que han sido o podrían haber sido 
utilizadas  para  describir  los  mecanismos  de pensamiento  acerca  de  los  conjuntos  infinitos, 
en particular el conjunto de los números naturales. Segundo, para determinar si estos mecanismos 
de pensamiento de  los individuos acerca del  conjunto )(NP  pueden ser  interpretados en 
términos de una o más de las perspectivas consideradas, analizamos la forma de pensar de ocho 
matemáticos. Mas allá de las concepciones negativas, o sea, de lo que )(NP  no es, los resultados 
de nuestro análisis nos hicieron dudar sobre si la comprensión de los individuos del conjunto 
)(NP  se extiende más allá de la definición formal. Hablamos de las posibles implicaciones de 
nuestros descubrimientos e indicamos futuros temas de investigación que podrían surgir de este 
estudio. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Conjuntos no numerables, APOE, metáfora, conjunto potencia, números 
naturales, imágenes mentales. 
ABSTRACT.  This study considers the question of whether individuals build mental structures for 
the set )(NP  that give meaning to the phrase, “all subsets of N .”  The contributions of our 
research concerning this question are two-fold. First, we identified constructivist perspectives that 
have been, or could be used to describe thinking about infinite sets, specifically, the set of natural 
numbers N . Second, to determine whether individuals’ thinking about the set )(NP can be 
interpreted in terms of one or more of the perspectives we considered, we analyzed the thinking of 
eight mathematicians. Beyond negative conceptions, that is, what )(NP is not, the results of our 
analysis cast doubt on whether individual understanding of the set )(NP extends beyond the 
formal definition. We discuss the possible implications of our findings, and indicate further 
research arising from this study. 
KEY WORDS: Uncountable sets, APOS, metaphor, power set, natural numbers, mental images. 
RESUMO. No presente estudo nos preguntamos se os indivíduos constroem estruturas mentais 
para o conjunto )(NP  que dá significado a expressão “todos os subconjuntos de N ”. Os aportes 
de   nossa    investigação   em   relação   a  esta  pregunta   tem   duas    vertentes.   Primeiramente,  
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indentificamos as perspectivas construtivistas que seriam ou poderiam ter sido utilizadas para 
descobrir os mecanismos de pensamento acerca dos conjuntos infinitos, em particular o conjunto 
dos números naturais. Segundo, para determinar se esses mecanismos de pensamento dos 
indivíduos  em relação  ao conjunto )(NP  podem  ser interpretados em termos de uma ou mais 
das perspectivas consideradas, analisamos a forma de pensar de oito matemáticos. Além das 
concepções negativas, isto é, de que )(NP  não é, os resultados de nossas análises trouzeram a 
dúvida sobre se os indivíduos compreendem o conjunto )(NP  além da definição formal. Falamos 
das possíveis implicações de nossas descobertas e indicamos futuros temas de investigação que 
poderão surgir deste estudo. 
PALAVRAS CHAVE: Conjuntos não enumeráveis, APOE, metáfora, conjunto potência, números 
naturais, imagens mentais. 
RÉSUMÉ. Dans cette étude nous nous demandons si les individus construisent des structures 
mentales spécifiques pour l’ensemble )(NP  («ensemble des sous-ensembles de N »). Nous 
décrivons ici  deux  des  principaux  apports de notre  recherche  en relation  à cette  question. 
Nous identifions tout d’abord les perspectives constructivistes utilisées ou potentiellement 
utilisables pour décrire les mécanismes de la pensée à propos des ensembles infinis, et en 
particulier l’ensemble des entiers  naturels. Ensuite, pour déterminer  si ces  mécanismes  de 
pensée des individus sur l’ensemble )(NP  peuvent être interprétés en termes d’une ou plusieurs 
des  perspectives considérées,  nous analysons  la forme de  penser de huit mathématiciens. Au-
delà des conceptions négatives, c'est-à-dire les approches de )(NP  essentiellement par ce qu’il 
n’est pas, les résultats de notre analyse laissent à penser que la compréhension des individus de 
l’ensemble )(NP  n’est va pas au delà de la définition formelle. Nous exposons enfin les possibles 
implications de nos résultats et nous soulignons de futurs sujets de recherche que cette étude peut 
dégager. 
MOTS CLÉS: Ensembles non dénombrables, APOE, métaphore, l’ensemble des parties, entiers 
naturels, images mentales.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncountable infinity is ubiquitous, both explicitly and implicitly, in the 
undergraduate mathematics curriculum. Explicitly, undergraduate mathematics 
majors study uncountable sets in Introduction to Proof or Transition courses and 
again in Analysis courses and upper division courses on set theory. Implicitly, 
students must work with uncountable sets in Calculus courses as they study 
functions, limits, and Riemann sums, often defined over uncountable domains. 
Participation in these courses and in many other situations in the field of 
mathematics should lead to constructions of new mental structures for dealing 
with uncountable sets. This has been true since G. Cantor began the 
A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING 95
development  of the mathematical  theory of infinite sets in  the latter  part of  
the 19th century. In these situations, the learner must grapple with the profound 
idea that there are different levels of infinity, proofs of uncountability, the 
continuum  hypothesis, the fact  that 2ℵ >ℵ  for any cardinal  number ℵ  and  
the relationship between ordinal and cardinal numbers. If our students are to 
understand, appreciate, and even further the development of these ideas, they 
must have an understanding of both countable and uncountable infinite sets. 
Nevertheless, mathematics textbooks regularly define uncountable as not 
countable. For a set  A , one can show that any injective function )(: APAf →  
from a set A  to its power set )(AP  cannot be surjective (see, for example, 
Chartrand, Polimeni, & Zhang, 2007). Applied to the set of natural numbers N , 
it follows that no bijective function can be defined between N and its power set 
)(NP . Therefore, the  uncountability  of the set )(NP   is rooted  in its not being 
countable. It is not surprising then that students and even some mathematicians 
do not have a description of what )(NP  is and try to find one by generalizing 
from properties of  finite  sets or  countable infinite sets. Although  knowing 
what something “is not” is a valuable part of conceptual understanding, most 
specialists in mathematics education, as well as many mathematicians, would 
deem an exclusively “negative” view of a concept as insufficient. 
One way logicians try to construct an uncountable set, for example )(NP , 
the power set of the natural numbers N , is to build a binary tree. The 
construction involves an iterative process, where any given step can be described 
recursively. However, no subset of  N arises by completing a particular step of 
the process,  nor is any  subset constructed  by determining the  resultant  state  
of the process (to use the language of Lakoff and Núñez, 2000). To construct a 
subset of N , one must first complete the tree (mentally speaking) and then 
traverse a particular path. No systematic procedure, iterative or otherwise, has 
been devised for  constructing all the paths through the tree. Thus, the binary 
tree does not enable  an individual  to make explicit the meaning of the phrase 
all subsets of N . 
This begs the question of whether some concepts in mathematics, such as 
uncountability, are exclusively formal. In terms of the notions of concept image 
and concept definition (Tall and Vinner, 1981), the concept image of the set 
)(NP , would, if purely formal, be essentially void.  According to Vinner 
(1991), this is an insufficient basis for understanding. He writes: “To know by 
heart a concept definition does not guarantee understanding of the concept. To 
understand … means to have a concept image” (p. 69). Thus, from a 
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constructivist perspective, conceptual understanding cannot rest exclusively on 
knowledge of the formal definition. In reality, one’s concept image is never 
completely void; the  words  of a  formal  mathematical  definition  would,  at 
the very least, evoke certain images, connect with previous experiences, or 
suggest informal descriptions. The issue, then, is the degree to which one’s 
concept image informs the meaning of the concept definition. For the set  )(NP , 
the question is whether one  can identify mental  structures that offer insight  
into the meaning of what “all subsets of N ” is, as opposed to what it is not.  
The answer to this question does not appear in the current literature. 
Although literature on the learning of concepts of infinity is vast (for a partial 
list of relevant sources, see Dubinsky, Weller, McDonald, & Brown, 2005a, 
2005b), most studies concern the comparison of infinite sets (e.g., Tall, 1980; 
Tirosh, 1999; Tsamir, 1999), the contradictory nature of infinity concepts (e.g., 
Fischbein,  Tirosh,  & Hess, 1979;  Moreno & Waldegg, 1991;  Tirosh, 1991),  
or historical/epistemological obstacles encountered in the conceptualization of 
infinite sets (e.g., Sierpinska & Viwegier, 1989; Jahnke, 2001). 
Few authors have tried to elaborate mental structures an individual or group 
of individuals might use in developing concepts of countable sets. Exceptions 
include Lakoff and Núñez (2000), Tall (2001), Dubinsky et al. (2005a, 2005b), 
Stenger, Vidakovic, and Weller (2005), and Brown, McDonald, and Weller (in 
press). Moreover, no source of which we are aware considers the development 
of mental structures for uncountable sets such as )(NP . 
Cantor (1941) struggled against the fact that no one had mental structures 
for any infinite sets. His  work  led  to  the development of such mental 
structures for countable sets. Our research set out to find mental structures that 
give meaning to the concept of )(NP , a meaning that goes beyond the formal 
definition. Dubinsky et al. (2005b) remark that most discussions of infinite 
processes in the literature, such as those found in Aristotle’s writings (according 
to Moore, 1999) and recently in Tirosh’s study (Tirosh, 1999) all involve 
iteration. Dubinsky et al. (2005b) propose that this might explain some 
difficulties that even contemporary students have with concepts of infinity. For 
example, some teachers of calculus feel that of the two formulations of the limit 
concept: 
For all ,0>ε  there exists 0>δ  such that if ,||0 δ<−< ax  then ε<− |)(| Lxf  
and 
For all ,n N∈  there exists 0>δ  such that if ,||0 δ<−< ax  then 
n
Lxf 1|)(| <−  
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students  tend  to  find  the  second  easier to  understand  than the  first. The 
authors suggest that this might be because the students can  understand the 
meaning  of  “For  all  n”  as  an  iterative  process,  whereas  no  such  process  
is apparent regarding “For all 0>ε ”. The authors suggest that if there is no 
apparent mental process underlying one’s conception of a set, as may be the case 
with uncountable sets, the meaning of “all” is not entirely clear. 
So we asked our question in a slightly different way. Does the literature 
include constructivist perspectives that might describe the development of 
mental structures for uncountable sets such as )(NP ? We found several 
candidates. Though not exhaustive, our list is representative. The perspectives 
cover a range of activities, such as visualization, imaging, intuition, metaphor, 
language,  and  reflective  abstraction.  These  perspectives  either  have   been, 
or could be, used  to  describe  thinking about  countable  sets (in our case, the 
set  of  natural  numbers N ). This raises  the  question  of  whether  any  of 
these perspectives could be extended to explain individual thinking about the 
uncountable set )(NP . To offer at least a tentative answer, we conducted 
interviews  with  eight mathematicians  and  examined  whether  they 
constructed mental structures for )(NP  that support the formal definition. 
Although we did not consider every possible constructivist perspective, those we 
considered encompassed our subjects’ responses to the following queries: 
“Describe your thinking about the set N ,” and “Describe your thinking about 
the set )(NP .” 
Before proceeding, we make several additional points. First, this report is 
only a preliminary investigation of )(NP . Our conclusions are tentative, and our 
interpretations are not absolute. 
The second point involves the meaning of the terms constructivism and 
mental structure. Although universal agreement on all  aspects of the meaning  
of constructivism eludes the mathematical and mathematical education 
communities, it  is  generally  considered that  constructivism includes  the 
notion that learning mathematics involves the construction of mathematical 
concepts in the minds of individuals, groups of individuals, or societies of 
individuals1. This does not mean that mathematical concepts are directly 
constructed. Rather, a learner constructs certain structures in her or his mind to 
make sense of mathematical problem situations. Thus, we offer the following, 
                                                     
1 We include groups and societies of individuals to reflect the fact that in our work we 
look for mental structures and their sources both in individuals (e.g., Weller et al, 
2003) and in social interactions (e.g., Vidakovic, 1997; Vidakovic & Martin, 2004). 
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not so much as a precise definition, but rather a framework for the perspectives 
used in our analysis. 
A mental structure is any relatively stable (although capable of 
development) structure (i.e., something constructed in one’s mind) that an 
individual  uses to  make  sense  of  mathematical  situations. A source 
for a mental structure is a description of where that structure comes from. 
A mental mechanism is a means by which that structure might develop in 
the mind(s) of an individual or a group of individuals. 
The last point concerns the significance of this study. Specifically, why is a 
purely formal definition of a concept insufficient, at least for students? In a study 
of 70 mathematicians’ thinking styles, and the social, intuitive, and aesthetic 
aspects of their learning, Burton (2001) found that her subjects valued 
meaningful, connected, and insightful explanations in their own work. On the 
other hand, she associated current disillusionment, both in school and university 
mathematics  teaching, with  a lack  of meaning,  connection,  and  insight. 
Many teachers of mathematics, interested in helping their students to build 
mental structures to make sense of formal mathematical ideas, share this 
constructivist viewpoint. 
In consideration of the issues just mentioned and the perspectives that 
guided our analysis, we pose the following research question: Did our subjects 
appear to build mental structures for the uncountable set )(NP  that give 
meaning to the phrase “all subsets of N ”? 
2. RELATED LITERATURE: PERSPECTIVES USED IN OUR ANALYSIS  
In this section, we briefly describe perspectives that might be relevant to our 
research question. We examine how each perspective explains, or could be used 
to explain, thinking about infinity. We do not discuss here how each perspective 
might, or might not, explain individual thinking about )(NP , as this is the goal 
of the section on data analysis. 
2.1. Visualization 
In our search through the literature on visualization, we concentrated on 
Presmeg (1985, 1986, 1998), Fischbein (1987), Zimmermann and Cunningham 
(1991), Dreyfus (1991, 1995), and Wheatly (1991), as well as references listed 
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in those articles. According to these authors, a visual image can be used to 
organize one’s  mathematical  thinking. Thus,  it  serves  as  a mental structure. 
In the view of some authors (e.g., Rodd, 2000), an individual constructs “spatial 
mental schemes” that are used as mathematical warrants. According to others 
(e.g., Kidron, 2003), visual activities, including computerized visualization, 
enhance the understanding of formal mathematics. Still, others (e.g., Zazkis, 
Dubinsky, & Dautermann, 1996) report that visual images contribute to analytic 
understandings, and vice-versa. In any case, the sources of visual images are the 
perceptual reports to an individual’s brain of that which is physically visualized, 
and  the  mental  mechanisms  are  the  operations  for  converting  perceptions 
to mental images. 
Although visualization could be incorporated in the next perspective on 
mental images (see Piaget & Inhelder, 1971)2, we have chosen to consider 
visualization separately and only in the case where the source is a direct physical 
perception (or the memory of one). 
In our review of the literature on visualization, we did not find any 
investigations on the use of visual image as a mental structure for countable sets. 
On one hand, this is not entirely unexpected. An infinite phenomenon cannot be 
directly visualized because the physical operation of perceptual mechanisms is 
necessarily finite. 
On the other hand, perceptual reports are interpreted by the mind, and, as 
Zazkis et al. (1996) found, visual and analytic thinking develop in tandem. Thus, 
one could imagine  a learner  visualizing  a finite  phenomenon  and extending, 
in her or his mind, the  finite phenomenon to  an infinite  one. This  could  lead 
to an understanding of a  mathematical concept related to infinity. In a sense, a 
start in this direction has been made by Tirosh (1999) and Tsamir (1999), who 
considered the effect on students’  understandings  of the cardinalities  of  
certain countable sets when (the initial terms of) these sets were presented either 
vertically or horizontally. 
2.2. Mental images 
Davis and Maher (1997) assert that mathematical concepts arise from mental 
images that are rooted in experiences (see also Hadamard, 1945; Aspinwall, 
                                                     
2 Piaget distinguishes between reproductive and anticipatory imagery. Reproductive 
imagery refers to reproducing in one’s mind that which has already been encountered. 
Anticipatory imagery refers to that which is not perceived by the senses. 
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Shaw, & Presmeg, 1997; Goldenberg, 1988; Sfard, 1997). Higher level concepts 
are developed by modifying old images or creating new ones based on existing 
images. In this way, new knowledge is constructed from previous knowledge. 
Thus, mental images are mental structures. The sources of mental images consist 
of experiences and previously constructed images, and the mental mechanisms 
are the  processes  used  to transform  those experiences  into images  or to 
create new images. More sophisticated mathematical concepts arise by 
developing more sophisticated human experiences, such as notational systems 
representing mathematical  operations. Although the  literature  on mental 
images does not specifically mention the development of infinite sets, one could 
conjecture that mental images for such sets might be created by associating a 
notational system to the process of counting or set formation. 
2.3. Intuitive insights 
Fischbein et al. (1979) characterize  intuition as knowledge that is “direct, 
global, and self-evident” (p. 5). According to Hersh (1997), intuition arises 
through the examination and manipulation of existing mental or physical objects. 
At an elementary level, this entails transformation of physical objects. At a more 
advanced level, one transforms mental objects in an effort to solve mathematical 
problems. In either case, the experience of transforming objects, whether 
physical or  mental, creates  what Hersh  calls  a mental  trace, a  mental 
structure that enables an individual to achieve new insights that often lead to the 
formation of  new  mathematical structures. Once developed, the individual 
seeks  to identify the properties of these new objects. At this  point, the 
individual uses mathematical proof to verify and to understand  the properties 
identified. The sources for intuition are the experiences that originate from 
repeated examination and manipulation of physical and/or mental objects. The 
transformation  of  experience  serves as  a mental  mechanism  that  leads  to  
the formation of a mental trace. 
Subconscious reflection, when applied to this mental structure, serves as a 
mental mechanism from which new insight, or intuition, arises. The new 
intuition, through further reflection and/or transformation, may lead to the 
creation of new mental objects or new intuitions. 
In the case of the natural numbers, according to Hersh, the concept of 
counting is  achieved  by manipulating  concrete objects. One  becomes  aware 
of the infinitude of the natural numbers by realizing that they can never be 
completely counted. Specifically, no matter what number is named, one can 
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name a higher number. This is the basis of the successor function, which leads to 
a conception of N as a single structure. 
2.4. Semiotics 
In their research on language and mathematics, Cobb, Boufi, McClain, and 
Whitenack (1997), Cobb, Yackel, and McClain (2000), Sfard (1998), and Tall et 
al. (2001) discuss the interplay between mental processes and mental objects, 
structures that underlie the formation of mathematical conceptions. Tall et al. 
(2001) explain  that symbols  serve  as pivots  between  process  and object. 
Sfard (1998) asserts that mathematical objects do not exist without the use of 
signifiers. Cobb, Boufi, et al. (1997), Cobb, Yackel, et al. (2000), and Sfard 
(1998) consider classroom discourse and symbolization as mental mechanisms 
that support reflective shifts in discourse between mental structures such as 
processes and objects. 
Many authors, such as Vygotsky (1981), Ernest (1997, 1998), and Rotman 
(1988, 1993, 2000), consider mathematics to be a language. Mathematical 
concepts are expressed in an individual’s mind in terms of that language, 
considered by Chomsky (2006), among others, to be a mental structure. The 
source of the semiotic perspective is social discourse about mathematical 
situations,  based  on  the  idea  that  language  is  also  a  mental  mechanism 
that molds thought (Vygotsky, 1978). Rotman (1988, 1993, 2000) also notes that 
symbols  embody  thought.  He  refers   to  the  creative  power  of  discourse 
and verbal exchange of thought, both oral and written. Specifically, 
mathematical learning involves the interplay of symbols, signs, proof, and 
mathematical objects within the social experiences of the individual learner. 
Similarly, Ernest (1997, 1998) asserts  that  language  enables  the formulation 
of mathematical ideas. 
Given that social experiences occur within a finite context, Rotman (1993) 
believes that infinite sets should be discarded from mathematics because they are 
physically unrealizable. Tall (2005), on the other hand, sees semiotics playing an 
important role in one’s understanding of infinity. For instance, he explains that 
the  “potentially  infinite  processes  of  sequences,  series, and the  calculus” 
take their toll on students who do not have semiotic resources from which to 
draw since one can never reach a limit in one’s lifetime. Despite this view, he 
does not offer an explicit description for the development of mental structures 
for infinite sets via symbolism. 
Beyond Tall, no explicit theory or discussion within the  semiotics literature  
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seems to relate to the development of mental structures for infinite sets. 
Obviously such a development could not be based on the strictly finitist 
interpretation of Rotman. Yet, others who believe that such a development is 
possible would need to determine how the use of language, symbols, and/or 
signs might be extended to help learners understand infinite processes that are 
not physically realizable. 
2.5. Metaphors 
Although there are many variations on the use of metaphors in the development 
of mathematical understanding (e.g., Fischbein, 2001; Sfard, 1994), we shall 
focus on the notion of conceptual metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Núñez 
(2000), since they explicitly apply the mental structure of metaphor to infinite 
sets. In general, they define conceptual metaphors as “grounded, inference-
preserving, cross-domain mappings” in which individuals “use the inferential 
structure of one conceptual domain to reason about another” (p. 6). Thus, 
metaphorical thinking involves the formulation of new situations in terms of 
more familiar contexts. In this way, the learner constructs new concepts. The 
sources for such thinking are the original situations that give rise to metaphors  
as mental structures. The “cross-domain mappings” serve as the mental 
mechanisms. 
According to Lakoff and Núñez, many infinity concepts involve application 
of the Basic Metaphor of Infinity (BMI). With this mental structure, the 
individual imposes on an unending process, conceptualized iteratively, a unique, 
final resultant state. In this way, an individual thinks of an unending process in 
terms of a finite process, which necessarily has a last term. For the countable 
set N , an individual begins with an initial state (Step 0), the empty set. Step 1 
consists of taking the union of the set }1{  with the empty set. In general, the 
process is described recursively: For an arbitrary step n , one forms the set 
},,2,1{ n…  by taking the union of the set }1,,2,1{ −n…  with the set }{n . 
Through application of the BMI, the individual imposes on the unending process 
a unique final state, in this case, the set N . 
2.6. APOS Theory 
Actions,  processes,  objects  and  schemas  are  all mental  structures (e.g., 
Asiala et al., 1996; Dubinsky & McDonald, 2001). The sources for actions are  
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external  stimuli  that  specify  a  transformation  of objects; for processes the 
sources are actions which are interiorized to processes; for objects the sources 
are processes which are encapsulated  into  objects;  and  for schemas the  
sources  are  previously  constructed  actions, process,  objects,  and schemas 
that are developed in stages called a triad (Piaget & Garcia, 1989; Cooley, 
Trigueros, & Baker, in press), and organized into a coherent whole. The mental 
mechanisms are operations such as interiorization, encapsulation, coordination 
(composition), and reversal. Recent studies by Dubinsky et al. (2005a, 2005b) 
have investigated how this perspective can be used to explain mathematical 
situations involving infinity, particularly the relationship between potential and 
actual infinity. These authors suggest that “potential  infinity is the  conception 
of the infinite as a process,” and that “actual infinity is the mental object 
obtained through encapsulation of that process” (p. 346). 
In an empirical study on infinite iteration, Brown et al. (in press) offer a 
description of the mental construction of infinite iterative processes (an instance 
of potential infinity) and their encapsulations (an instance of actual infinity). To 
construct mentally the natural numbers N , an individual might begin, as with 
metaphors, by performing a small number of iterations, for instance, writing or 
speaking about a sequence of finite sets such as }3,2,1{},2,1{},1{   . These actions 
are then interiorized into a finite mental process. To obtain the first n  counting 
numbers, one  adds  1  to 1−n , and adjoins  the resulting  natural number n  to 
the set }1,,2,1{ −n… . Coordination of multiple instantiations of this finite 
process leads to construction of an infinite iterative process. Here, the similarity 
with metaphors ends. Once the process is viewed as complete (i.e., an 
understanding that each step yields a set of the form },,2,1{ n… ), and as a totality 
(i.e., an ability to see all of the steps in the process as a single, atemporal 
operation), the process may be encapsulated as the result of an action, or 
attempted action, being applied to it. In the case of infinite iteration, this might 
be an action of evaluation, for instance, “What do I have?” or “What comes 
next?” The former action involves accumulation: the object that arises from the 
encapsulation  consists  of the  totality  of  objects  produced  by  each  step of 
the process. The latter  action is  extensive: encapsulation leads to construction 
of a successor object that appears “next”. In  some instances,  both actions may 
yield the same object. In others, different objects may arise. In either case, the 
resulting  object “stands outside” the process; it is not produced by completion 
of any step. For this reason, Brown et al. (in press) refer to the object obtained 
by encapsulating an infinite iterative process as a transcendent object. 
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2.7. Mathematical formalism 
According to Dubinsky (2000), formalism guides the development of mental 
structures in some mathematical situations. That is, one uses the syntax of a 
formal statement in a conscious manner to direct specific constructions of 
actions, processes, objects, and schemas. In  other words, the formal  statement 
of the concept motivates the development of certain mental structures. MacLane 
(1981) asserts that mathematics consists of applying rigor and deduction to 
ordinary human experiences so as to uncover hidden properties. Tall (2001) 
concurs, stating that “we reflect on our perceptions to create new cognitive 
images within our personal cognitive structures” (p. 220). For each of these 
perspectives, formalism is a mental mechanism that leads to the development of 
certain mental structures. MacLane (1986) suggests that the set N  (among other 
mathematical entities) arises from the human activities of counting and listing. 
One then applies the rigor of Peano’s Postulates to prove the standard arithmetic 
properties for N . In a similar vein, Tall (2001) asserts that individuals begin 
with a concept image of the set of natural numbers, and then apply Peano’s 
Postulates as a formalism, which, he argues, leads to more subtle visual imagery 
(see also Zazkis et al., 1996).  
3. METHODOLOGY  
In exploring the  mental structures  individuals  might build for the set )(NP ,  
we discussed the issue with eight mathematicians. The eight subjects represented 
diverse mathematical interests, with one logician among the group. Subjects 
were asked two questions, “What is your conception of the natural 
numbers N ?”,  and “What  is your  conception of  the power set  of  the  natural 
numbers, )(NP ?” For the set N , we did not expect to find anything new. 
Questions about N  served two purposes: to determine how the selected 
perspectives could be  used to explain  individual thinking about infinite sets; 
and to serve as a baseline for the analysis of our subjects’ thinking about )(NP . 
For both questions, the interviewers first posed the question, and allowed each 
subject to describe her or his thinking. The interviewers asked follow-up 
questions to clarify a subject’s responses, or to probe further into a subject’s 
thinking. With the exception of one interview, conducted as an email discussion, 
each interview lasted  about one hour, was audio-taped, transcribed verbatim, 
and then checked for accuracy. 
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Following the steps of data analysis set forth in Asiala et al. (1996), we 
scripted each of the transcripts. In the script, the interview was organized into a 
two-column format, where  the first column  contained the original transcript, 
and  the second  short  statements  used  to  sketch  interview  passages. Then, 
we prepared  a table of contents to formulate a list of issues, identifying 
instances where a given perspective might apply. Two of the authors reviewed 
each interview, noting evidence of thinking that aligned with a particular 
perspective. Evidence consisted of identifying specific phrases that reflected the 
construction, attempted construction, or use of mental structures associated with 
a particular perspective. We also looked for, but did not find, any evidence of 
perspectives other than those we selected for study in this paper. The two 
reviewers negotiated differences and shared their findings with the entire team. 
This approach served two purposes: triangulation of results and reliability. In the 
presentation of the data, the reader will note that there is not always a sharp 
distinction between different perspectives. Thus, we do not assert that our 
subjects’ statements reflect a single perspective exclusively. Rather, we are 
interested in whether a given perspective might be used to describe a subject’s 
thinking about N  and/or )(NP . Specifically, did the subject give evidence of 
evoking, constructing, or trying to construct, a mental structure for the set )(NP  
that would infuse the formal definition with greater meaning?  
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Eight subjects, Claudia, Cecil, Doris, Ian, Kathryn, Marcus, Quinn, and Ranae3, 
participated in the study. For each perspective, we summarize the subjects’ 
thinking, and present representative excerpts to illustrate our claims. As noted 
earlier, none of the results for the set N  is new. We included an analysis of this 
set to determine the applicability of a given perspective, and to serve as a 
baseline for our analysis of )(NP , the main focus of our investigation.  
4.1 Visualization 
For the set N , six of the eight mathematicians described the set N  using a 
visual representation. For instance, Claudia, Ian, Doris, Marcus, and Quinn 
                                                     
3 Pseudonyms have been used for all of the interview subjects. 
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referred to the number line. The following excerpt from Marcus, in response to 
the question of how he thinks about N , is representative: 
Marcus:  I guess I just think about the real number line. I always see that ole’ one up 
above the board, back when I was in grade school, that’s just what I think 
of, obviously the right hand side. 
This finite visual image was a likely source for development of his mental 
structure of N . He builds N  by successively adding one at each step: 
Marcus: I’ve got the number 1 … and I guess I just interpret it in terms of the 
operation of addition. I think of one plus one, one plus one plus one, and so 
forth … that’s about the way I think of it. 
As noted earlier, a direct visual perception cannot record an infinite 
phenomenon. To  construct the  set N , Marcus’ visual  representation   evoked a 
process of finite enumeration that, when extended, indicated successive 
additions of 1, ad  infinitum. Thus,  the  visual  representation  served  as a 
source for the formation of an iterative process, a mechanism Marcus used to 
build a mental structure for the set N .  
Unlike N , none of the mathematicians in our study recounted direct 
physical visualizations as sources for )(NP . For instance, no subject referred to 
the real line as an infinite set of points to which each element of )(NP  
corresponds.  
4.2 Mental images 
All but one of the eight subjects described a mental image for an initial finite 
segment of the set N . For instance, Ranae reveals an image of N  as a sequence 
of numerals:  
  Ranae: ... my mental image ... is just starting to see the list of them. I mean like the 
sequence of numbers ... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, whatever. 
Similarly, Cecil starts with a visual image of falling dominoes that serves as 
a source for his mental image of N  as a “bundle of stuff”:  
Cecil: Uhh ... dominoes ... but that’s pretty much all. It’s just ... uh ... and sort of in 
your mind, the successor function.  You’ve gotta start and you go from one 
place to another.  ... When you’re all done you sort of back off and say OK 
there’s this big set of things and given any point you can move to any other 
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point and they’re ordered uh, but uh, in some other situations you want to 
think of them as just a bundle of stuff that you can get around in. 
For Cecil, falling dominoes indicated enumeration, the basis of the 
successor function. The  successor  function  served  as  a mental mechanism 
that conjured an image of N  as “a bundle of stuff,” a totality where “given any 
point you can move to another point.”  
Four of the eight subjects offered mental images of )(NP . For instance, 
Kathryn saw )(NP  as “very, very big, in some sense unknowable.” Similarly, 
Doris  saw )(NP  as a “quagmire”:  
    Doris: Yeah, so as soon as you said that, I’m like oh! yes, that’s the ... I really think 
I just, as far as how I conceive of it, it’s just the definition, so I’m just 
looking at all the subsets, it’s just this quagmire of subsets [both laugh]. As 
far as a mental image, that’s what I’ve got. 
Ian used his remembered experience with tree structures, likely obtained 
from physical images, or in writing computer programs, to construct a mental 
structure represented mathematically as a recursive process. However, the 
process he describes only yields finite subsets of N . 
        Ian: Well, let’s see, I guess I would do it recursively in sort of ... think of a tree 
process I suppose.  I would have a set with one up through k  whatever k  
is. You have a start, and so then I would throw, go up one level and throw in 
1k + , so now you’d have one plus k   through one.  And then I would go 
down a level putting 1k +  together with everything that was in the original 
set from one to k . 
At each recursive level k , Ian built the power set of the set { }k,...,2,1 . 
Although this process yields all of the finite elements of )(NP , no infinite 
elements of )(NP  arise. Ian eventually realizes this, and sees that something 
more is needed. Part of his difficulty stems from his belief that an infinite 
process can never be finished in one’s mind4. 
            I: Could you talk a little more about the finishing of this process? What does it 
mean at least to you mentally to finish this up, to get everything? 
                                                     
4 In the excerpts, “I” denotes the interviewer, although various interviews were 
conducted by different members of the RUMEC (Research in Undergraduate 
Mathematics Education Community) infinity research team. The research team includes 
the authors of this paper plus Michael McDonald and Anne Brown. 
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        Ian: Means really nothing to me. I would never finish it. This tree can get just as 
high as you need it to get. You give me a finite place you want it to reach 
and I can reach that. And that finite place can be as large as you want to 
make it but it would never finish. I really don’t know; don’t have much of a  
concept of finishing that as such at all. 
            I: But go back to the set of natural numbers. Do you not have a concept of 
finishing that process and therefore you really can’t have the set of natural 
numbers? 
        Ian: I have no real concept of finishing that process either. Again, natural 
numbers ... those things ... there’s no end to it, so I can build you ... I can 
give you the set, list physically the elements of the set as high as you want 
me to go and if you want me to go higher, I’ll go higher. But no, there’s no 
sense to me at least of finishing listing the set of natural numbers or just of 
the set of natural numbers. I think of as being endless. There is no finishing 
to them. 
For  Ian, the mental image of a tree is consistent with, and may contribute 
to, his belief that an infinite set cannot be  created. Just as the tree would never 
be complete,  the  mental  structure he attempted  to build  for )(NP  would 
never be complete. 
For Doris and Kathryn, their vague images may have helped them to see 
“all” as an immense, seemingly indescribable collection. However, neither 
image led to formation of a mental structure, nor did their images offer a precise 
sense of the difference in magnitude  between the two sets N  and )(NP . For 
the set N , mental images served as sources for the development of iterative 
processes (e.g., Cecil) that inspired use of the successor function, a mechanism 
leading to a view of the natural numbers as a totality. In contrast, mental images 
for )(NP  did not serve as sources for the development of mental structures. For 
example, Doris’ view of )(NP  as a “quagmire” left her with “just the 
definition.”  
4.3. Intuitive insights 
According to Hersh (1997), the “fundamental intuition of the natural numbers” 
is a “shared concept, an idea held in common after manipulating coins, bricks, 
buttons, and pebbles” (p. 65). In  describing their thinking about N , seven of the 
eight subjects mentioned counting or manipulating physical objects. This 
“shared concept” was a common source, motivating the development of mental 
mechanisms, that is, ways of conceiving the endless nature of enumeration. For 
instance, Claudia described N  as “the collection of things 1, 2, 3, and I could 
A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING 109
keep counting as long as I wanted to”; Cecil  thought of N  as “the description 
of a process”; and Quinn saw N  as a progression that “continues and there is no 
end.” These types of intuitions appeared to inspire more formal descriptions of 
infinite enumeration, such as “the successor function” (Cecil), or an infinite 
sequence of repeated additions of 1 (Claudia, Marcus, Ranae).  Further reflection 
on the process of successively adding 1 led to an intuitive view of N  as a 
complete mental structure. According to Claudia, such intuitions precede one’s 
ability to think of N  more formally: 
Claudia: Somehow you have to know in advance what the integers are before you can 
take the union over all the finite truncations of the natural numbers. 
           I: Why do you need to know in advance what they are? 
Claudia: It’s that I don’t know what the collection of all those finite segments of the 
natural numbers is unless I know what the set of natural numbers is.  
           I: OK, so what I hear you say is that you don’t see intuitively how you get 
from the formation of all these finite sets to the whole set. 
Claudia: I don’t see how I can do that without having an intuitive picture of the 
whole set. 
For our subjects, counting and manipulating physical objects served as a 
source for intuitive conceptions that eventually led to the development of 
structures such as the successor function. These more formal structures were 
used as mental mechanisms to develop mental structures to inform conceptions 
of what N  is. 
Our subjects’ intuitions regarding the set )(NP  were just the opposite, 
rooted in experiences of what )(NP  is not. This certainly seemed to be the case 
for Doris, whose repeated efforts to enumerate the set of all subsets of N  
ultimately failed: 
    Doris: I used to love  when  I was  young sitting  there  and  trying  to list out all 
the subsets of some finite set, and I could just see myself doing this with the 
natural numbers, and I could see that I wouldn’t get done, and I knew that. 
            I: Yeah, I know what you mean, I did that too. 
    Doris: And I’m not sure at what point, I know it was pretty late along the line, 
when I  realized  that  even if I did keep doing that, that when I was done, I 
would have missed some or something. 
When asked to describe )(NP , several subjects (Claudia, Ian, Ranae, and 
Marcus) attempted to construct  iterative processes to  obtain )(NP . Their  use 
of iteration likely arose from prior experiences with countable collections where 
iterative  processes  abound. However,  as Claudia  realized, “I’d  end up with 
the set of all finite subsets.” Her insight, spontaneous and not the result of any 
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deductive  or  inductive  reasoning, suggests intuitive thinking. This intuition 
helped her to see the error in her construction. 
Cecil invoked another familiar intuition regarding uncountable sets. When 
asked to describe a construction for )(NP , he quickly rejected the possibility. 
Repeated experiences with countable processes, rendering only countable 
collections, helped formulate an intuition that uncountable sets cannot be 
obtained from countable processes: 
            I: In the same spirit as the process that constructed a single infinite set ... 
Could we step it up one more level so that it could be used to construct all of 
the subsets of N ? 
    Cecil: Back in the old days, there’s this little part that says the power set has a 
higher cardinality than the set you started with, and therefore, I’m pretty 
sure I can’t prove it  anytime  soon (laughter). Given  a long  time, I might 
be able to, but the power set is of higher cardinality. If you’re countable 
here, you’re not going to be countable there. 
For the set N , repeated experiences with counting served as a source for 
intuitions regarding the unending nature of enumeration. This resulted in 
development of more formal mechanisms. For most of the subjects, seeing the 
set N  as a completed structure arose from infinite application of the successor 
function, or a process of repeatedly adding 1. Intuitions underlying the set )(NP  
worked differently. On the basis of unsuccessful attempts to list the subsets of 
N , Doris concluded that the elements of )(NP  cannot be listed. Prior 
knowledge about  the  uncountability  of )(NP  informed Cecil’s  belief that 
)(NP  cannot be constructed  iteratively. Experiences  with  iterative  processes  
led several  of the subjects to realize the futility of their attempts to 
construct )(NP . None generated an intuition from which a stable mental 
structure for )(NP  arose. As Kathryn pointed out, “I think of )(NP  as … in 
some sense unknowable.” This begs the question: Are intuitions of )(NP  
necessarily rooted in terms of what )(NP  is not? 
4.4. Semiotics 
Three of the eight subjects used symbol and language in ways suggested by the 
semiotics  perspective. As  a  list, Ranae  claimed that  no one  can  see  all  of 
the natural numbers at once. In accordance with Sfard’s (1998) description, 
Ranae used a signifier, the letter N , to see the totality of the natural numbers: 
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  Ranae: In an abstract way we can see all of them [the natural numbers] at once with 
capital N , that’s it, you know? That’s kind of like the embodiment of them. 
So you see that big N  and that is the natural numbers and ... and so you’re 
seeing the set of natural numbers. 
For Ranae, the symbol N  served as a mental mechanism for construction 
of a mental structure for the set of all natural numbers. The list of numerals 
appeared to be a source for her thinking. 
For Doris, the list of the first few natural numbers served as a pivot between 
process and object. 
           I: So, you said one comma two comma three comma, etcetera... 
   Doris: That’s what I said. 
           I: What does that mean, “etcetera”? 
   Doris: Oh, I just see more numbers. 
           I: How far? 
   Doris: Depends on how far I look. 
           I: As far as you want to? 
    Doris: Oh, probably [both laugh]. 
           I: Okay, then, how do you get from that description to the set of all natural 
numbers? 
    Doris: Oh no, that’s the set of all natural numbers. 
With the list as symbol, Doris could pivot, as Tall et al. (2001) suggest, 
between the process of writing out the list as far as she wished, and the set of all 
natural numbers as an object. 
Our subjects did not construct )(NP  as a mental structure using the 
semiotics perspective. For example, Ian generated subsets of N  recursively by 
listing the elements of the power set ( )},,2,1{ nP …  for successive values of  n . 
However, this process only yields the finite subsets of N . Although Doris 
discussed difficulties her students encountered with )(NP , she focused on the 
manner  in  which  symbol  notation for sets (e.g., braces { }) distracts rather 
than helps students who have difficulty understanding the concept of set: 
    Doris: The students aren’t clear about sets in the first place and you start stumbling 
over the notation and somehow those braces appear. 
For several of our subjects, symbolization served as a mental mechanism 
that supported  reflective  shifts in  discourse  that contributed  to  construction 
of the set N  as a mental structure. The excerpts tell a different story for )(NP : 
none  of   our  subjects  used  semiotics   in   ways  suggested  by   the   semiotics 
perspective to construct a mental structure for this set. 
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4.5. Metaphors and APOS Theory 
We consider these two perspectives together, in part because of similarities in 
the transition from finite to infinite iteration, but, more importantly, to highlight 
differences. When  considering  the  transition  from finite  to infinite  iteration 
in the countably infinite case, the BMI and APOS Theory appear similar.  
For instance, the following excerpts from Claudia, Ranae, and Quinn could 
be interpreted using either perspective: 
Claudia: I can start with the set containing just 1 and then I can start with the set 
containing 1 and its successor 2, and now I’m going to make some kind of 
informal application of an inductive scheme. 
  Ranae: I mean like whatever the first number that I have I add one to it, you know 
given any number down the line add one to it you get the next one. 
  Quinn: Any repetitive thing that you see that you can do forever, you rarely 
continue with it. You usually  stop and say, I can do this as long as 
necessary for me to have more numbers. 
Claudia’s use of the phrase “inductive scheme,” Ranae’s comment that 
“given any number down the line add one to it,” and Quinn’s description of the 
construction as a “repetitive thing that you see that you can do forever,” 
exemplify a transition from finite to infinite iteration. According to APOS 
Theory, this transition occurs by application of the mental mechanisms of 
interiorization and coordination. Specifically, the actions of performing the first 
few steps are interiorized into a mental process, and then multiple instantiations 
of that process (with different initial and terminal points) are coordinated to form 
an infinite iterative process. For instance, interiorization and coordination lead to 
development of an inductive scheme. According to Lakoff and Núñez (2000), 
the mental mechanism of the BMI  facilitates the  transition. After construction 
of the initial state, and the first step arising from the initial state, one constructs 
an infinite process that produces any intermediate state from its predecessor. 
Claudia’s inductive scheme could be interpreted as a process that yields any 
intermediate  state. At this  point, the  similarities end. Yet, the distinction is 
very subtle. In the case of the BMI, the final resultant state arises by 
metaphorically  conceptualizing  the  infinite  process as if it  were a process 
with a last term. In the case of APOS Theory, the resultant state arises through 
encapsulation, which occurs as one applies an action to the process as a 
completed whole. Of the five subjects  who  gave evidence of constructing N  
by iteration, none appeared to think of N  metaphorically. For instance, Claudia 
and Ranae refer to specific actions: 
           I:  What I understood you said is that you form the singleton 1, {1,2}, {1,2,3}  
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and you continue with that and then after you’ve built all of those … 
Claudia: Then I take the union.  
  Ranae: The limit of this sequence [she is referring to {1}, {1,2}, {1,2,3}, …] would 
be the natural numbers … you know, if you are looking at it as a sequence 
of sets. 
Claudia encapsulates her iterative process in response to the action of taking 
the union. Ranae also makes an encapsulation, but thinks in terms of a limit. In 
her interview, Doris, who sees N  as “all of it being there,” creates a unifying 
structure that  encompasses  the  objects  produced  by each step. In each of 
these cases,  the  resultant state, the  set N , transcends  any  step  of  the process 
from which it arises. Thus, APOS Theory seems to explain more readily how the 
subjects built mental structures for N .  
For )(NP , as with the other perspectives considered thus far, the situation 
was far different. Although several subjects used iterative processes in their 
attempts to  build  mental  structures  for )(NP , none  was successful. In fact, 
the subjects described processes whose final resultant states were only the finite 
subsets  of  N . The following  excerpt  from  Claudia’s interview  represents 
one such example: 
Claudia: I could take the empty set, then I could look at all the singletons, then I 
could look at all the doubletons, is that the right? 
           I: Two element sets. 
Claudia: Two element sets, then I could look at all the three element sets. 
           I: And if you did that forever? 
Claudia: I would end up with ... No I would not end up with all the subsets, because 
the set of all even integers is a subset but I’m not gonna pick that one up as a 
finite subset. 
Ranae, possessing only an action structure (in terms of APOS), resorts to 
“hand waving” in her attempt to describe the elements of )(NP :  
Ranae: Um ... so you take ... it isn’t like you can just add one to it. Well the trouble 
is though there’s other subsets than these so ... I mean because there’s also { }3,2  and there’s also { }4,3  and there’s also { }7,6  and there’s also { }29,21  
  Ranae: You know, I was only thinking of finite subsets though ... to be honest ... 
and see ... I can’t,  unless  I take  a  class  that’s  called  “infinite”  and  don’t  
bother with its cardinality or anything like that. If I just take all the ... I have 
all the ones that are finite, take care of them by the way I was just telling 
you and then just have this one big class that’s infinite and there would 
probably be an infinite number of those and, but could I really do that with 
an iterative process? … Yeah, I know it. It isn’t going to be possible. Well, 
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why  isn’t it?  Because  if I can  do  the  natural  numbers, I’m not sure how 
I would do that unless I just ... plunked them all in there and sort of did 
some hand waving. 
Cecil begins with the action of forming small finite sets of natural numbers. 
He tries to  extend this to an iterative process but realizes that his description 
fails to yield infinite subsets of N . 
    Cecil: No. The set of all subsets. Ahh, you start to build it but then almost 
immediately, back off because it’s ... there’s a process that you could go 
through. OK,  here’s { }1 , and  here’s { }2   and { }3 . Those  are all going to be 
in there, then { }2,1  will be in there and { }3,2,1  will be in there and I’m 
always ... at the beginning. I haven’t really looked at ... I haven’t thought 
about this before ... infinite subsets, I’m still ... I’m caught back here at 
finite  subsets  but I haven’t  said ... and all the odd numbers are a subset of 
... and all the even numbers are a subset, and multiples of three  are a subset 
and just the idea that, boy, it’s a whopper and, uh, I know how to form ... 
you know if somebody gives me one of these sets I can say whether it’s a 
subset or not. 
Claudia and Ranae tried to construct iterative processes where, for each step 
n , one lists all of the subsets of that cardinality. Cecil made a similar attempt, 
but was less successful. Ian, as noted in the section on Mental Images, 
constructed the power set { }( )nP ,...,2,1  for each step n . Like Claudia, Ranae, 
and Cecil, his construction only yielded the finite elements of )(NP . However, 
unlike Claudia, Ranae, and Cecil, Ian  demonstrated  reluctance  throughout  his  
interview  to see any infinite process as complete, whether building a mental 
structure for N , or attempting to build a mental structure for )(NP .  
One subject, Kathryn, alluded to encapsulation. In the excerpt below, she 
talks about a “giant leap past recursion”:  
Kathryn: Think to talk about )(NP  in its entirety you have to make a kind of giant 
leap past recursion. Even to talk about one non-defined object of )(NP  
needs such a leap, but maybe not such a large one, since the relevant axiom 
there is countable choice, which is much more limited ontologically than the 
power set axiom. 
Like the other subjects, though, she does not describe any process structure 
to which the mechanism of encapsulation could be applied. Thus, we cannot say 
what mental structures she may have constructed. 
For   the  set  N , our  subjects did  what  an  APOS  analysis  calls for. 
They started  with  actions,  a  source  for  a  finite iterative process, which they  
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constructed  using  the  mechanism  of  interiorization. They  applied  actions to 
a completed infinite process and encapsulated that process to yield N  as the 
transcendent object.  While the BMI could be used to explain  the construction 
of  an  infinite  iterative process,  APOS Theory  appeared  to  align  more 
closely with the subjects’ tendencies to apply actions to the process structures 
they formed.  
For )(NP , none of the subjects successfully constructed mental structures 
for the set )(NP . Several tried to construct iterative processes, but they soon 
realized the futility of their attempts. Kathryn noted that )(NP  might be a giant 
step past recursion, but her insight did not help her to build a mental structure for 
the set )(NP .  
4.6. Mathematical formalism 
Several of our subjects referred to formal definitions and theorems in their 
attempts  to  create  meaning for  the set N . As an illustration,  we include 
below an excerpt from Quinn, who offers an informal definition of the natural 
numbers N , and then suggests use of the Peano Postulates or the successor 
function to construct the entire set. 
   Quinn: A string of discretely placed dots on the line that continue. I don’t try to 
envision the end of the line. 
            I: Right, and how would you think about actually constructing, enumerating 
the natural numbers? How would you sort of get them? 
   Quinn: I’m not sure, if you mean something like the Peano Postulates. 
           I: If I said to you, so what are the natural numbers? 
  Quinn: I guess I would just say the numbers that people learned to count with in 
their earliest years, 1, 2, 3, and so forth. 
           I: Ahh, yeah. That’s the point I was trying to get, 1, 2, 3 and so forth. So if you 
thought of putting that all together you might start with nothing, with the 
empty set, and you might throw in 1 and what would you do next? 
Quinn: Throw in a successor, and then a successor, and so forth. 
          I: Right, and what does that have to do with the natural numbers? 
  Quinn: Well, I think what we are creating are the natural numbers. 
Quinn used the number line, a visual perception, to elicit a sequence of 
numerals, a mental  image, to  serve  as  a  source  for  construction  of  the  set 
of natural  numbers. He then coordinated  the  process  of finite  enumeration  
with a formal structure, in this case, Peano’s Postulates, to see  the natural 
numbers in their totality. Two other subjects applied formalism in similar ways. 
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They started with some version of counting or successively adding 1, and then 
applied rigorous mathematical mechanisms such as induction or recursion to 
construct the set N . 
This situation contrasted sharply with what we found for )(NP . Most of the 
subjects attempted to list subsets, generally starting with small subsets and then 
increasing cardinality. After realizing  that such  processes  would  only  yield 
the finite subsets of N , several participants made references to the use of 
formalism. For example, Kathryn referred to the ZFC axioms, while Quinn 
suggested the Schroeder-Bernstein theorem (which, we note, is not about )(NP ). 
Despite several attempts, no one described any mathematical structure that 
would obtain the set of all of the subsets of N . Kathryn came closest: 
Kathryn: The intuition that you should be able to talk about all subsets of N  came 
much earlier than the binary tree, out of a kind of naive philosophical 
intuition and not out of any formality. That is, )(NP should exist, because if 
you can talk about one subset you should be able to talk about all of them. 
And, of course, backing up the naive intuition, one of the ZFC axioms is 
that if X  is a set, so is )(XP .  
Kathryn starts with subsets of N  as a source for her thinking and, as Tall 
(2001) suggests, proposes formalization in an axiomatic system as a mechanism 
to establish  the  existence of )(NP . However, her application of this ZFC 
axiom did not lead to any knowledge about the structure of )(NP . Similarly, 
Quinn alludes  to formal  ideas as the  basis  for  his  thinking about )(NP , but 
he is not able to construct or recall any formal structures that inform his 
understanding.  
Quinn: Even when I was trying to get the full thing organized in my mind, I think I 
tended to think in terms of classical results and things that had been shown 
and which sets were larger than which other sets. And the Schroeder-
Bernstein theorem comes in here somewhere. Don’t ask me to quote it right 
now, but I remember thinking that it gave certain organization to my 
thinking process. 
            I: So you used some of the formal results of mathematics. 
   Quinn: Yeah, exactly. Without that impetus, I can’t imagine that I ever would have 
actually sat down and really thought about the set of all subsets of anything. 
            I: But now  that  you  have  that  impetus, you  know those theorems or at least 
you did. Can you think about all of the subsets of the natural numbers? 
   Quinn: Well, I said as a theoretical  construct, I know that, you know it’s another 
one  of those things  where you can give examples until you are weary of the 
process and withdraw [laughter]. 
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Quinn’s reference to Schroeder-Bernstein concerns the cardinality of 
infinite sets, so application of this theorem certainly would not lead to a rigorous 
formulation of the structure of )(NP . Nevertheless, use of Schroeder-Bernstein 
gives evidence of Quinn’s attempt to apply formal ideas to describe )(NP , 
something MacLane (1986) and Tall (2001) propose. 
Doris also refers to use of formalism. After disclosing that her only 
experience with )(NP  was restricted to cardinality issues, she notes that her 
perception of  )(NP  is reduced to “just the definition.” 
    Doris: The main time that I would deal with the power set of the natural numbers is 
when I’m dealing with cardinality. So the first thing I’d think of is the 
cardinality of it, which is bigger, and that whole question. 
            I: The uncountability? 
    Doris: Yeah, so as soon as you said that, I’m like oh! yes, that’s the ... I really think 
I just ... as far as how I conceive of it, it’s just the definition.  
Despite an emphasis on formalism, Doris did not build a mental structure to 
derive meaning from the formalism in a manner suggested by Dubinsky (2000). 
Instead, she only saw a “quagmire.”   
Again, the subjects’ thinking about N  contrasted with their thinking about 
)(NP . For N , several of the subjects appeared to build mental structures using 
formalism in ways predicted by MacLane (1986) and Tall (2001). For )(NP , 
the attempts to use formalism failed. In particular, Doris, who mentioned the 
definition, made no attempt to apply the mechanisms of APOS Theory, as 
Dubinsky (2000) suggests, to build a mental structure for the set.  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our research  question  considered  the  issue,  unaddressed  in  the  literature,  of 
whether individual understanding of the uncountable set )(NP  can be described 
using a constructivist  perspective. Specifically,  do  individuals  construct 
mental structures for the set )(NP  that both amplify the meaning of the formal 
definition and go beyond the mere assertion that )(NP  is not countable? To help 
answer this question, we asked eight mathematicians to explain their thinking 
about )(NP . We analyzed their responses using different perspectives. We 
deemed these perspectives constructivist, because we could identify certain 
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mental structures, sources from which those structures develop, and mechanisms 
that lead  to  their  development. Our definition of the term ‘mental structure’ 
was not precise. Instead, it provided a framework for consideration of the 
perspectives used in the analysis. The list of perspectives was not exhaustive, but 
representative; it covered a wide range of cognitive activities, and encompassed 
all of our subjects’ responses. Furthermore, each perspective either has been, or 
could possibly be, applied to explain individual thinking about countable sets, in 
this  instance,  the  set  of  natural  numbers N . Even  though  the set N  was 
not the focus of our investigation, we reported our subjects’ thinking about N  to 
serve as a baseline, or backdrop, for our analysis of )(NP . The data illustrated a 
sharp contrast. For the set N , our subjects evoked, or built, mental structures for 
N . Each subject’s thinking could be described using one or more of the 
perspectives we considered. 
For )(NP , the situation was just the opposite. Although our subjects made 
valiant attempts  to build mental structures, in  support of Burton’s (2001) 
finding that mathematicians value meaningful, connected, and insightful 
explanations, their  attempts  were  unsuccessful. Their  responses  were  
generally  limited    to vague mental images, intuitions of what )(NP  is not, 
failed attempts to construct processes, and misapplications or incomplete 
applications of formalism. These results, especially in contrast to what was 
reported for N , indicate strong support for the following empirical claim: until 
further advances can be made in our understanding of )(NP , absence of 
evidence of mental structures for )(NP  is evidence of absence of those 
structures. In particular, explanations for the meaning of the word “all” in an 
uncountable context, beyond the assertion that it is non-iterative, did not arise. 
In summary of the perspectives, no subject offered evidence of a visual 
perception to which other mental mechanisms could be applied to build a mental 
structure for )(NP . On one hand, this was not surprising. As Lakoff and Núñez 
(2000) note, on-going processes, even if continuous, are conceived iteratively. 
Yet, no purely iterative image could give rise to an uncountable entity. On the 
other hand, the real line is a visual representation of an uncountable set that 
corresponds with )(NP . However, it is not clear how an image of the real line 
would give greater meaning to the word “all.”  
At least two mental images arose in descriptions of )(NP . Doris referred to 
)(NP  as a “quagmire,” and Kathryn stated that )(NP  was “very, very big, in 
some sense unknowable.” Both images suggest “larger than countable,” but 
neither would likely motivate new experiences that would inspire development 
A SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING 119
of new images that would make more precise the meaning of “all” in the formal 
definition.  
Intuitions develop through repeated experiences that leave mental traces. 
Our subjects repeatedly used iteration in their attempts to build mental structures 
for )(NP . Although their attempts failed, spontaneous realizations of the futility 
of their approaches abounded. Yet, these intuitions informed a notion of what 
)(NP  is not; they did not serve as sources for mental structures for )(NP . 
Several subjects tried to apply formalism. Doris and Quinn’s attempts were 
unsuccessful. Kathryn quoted one of the ZFC axioms, but the axiom to which 
she referred, only establishes the existence of the set )(NP  (given the 
assumption that N  is a set). Mathematically, establishment of existence is 
crucial. From a constructivist perspective, it is insufficient.  
When asked to describe the set )(NP , six of the eight subjects listed 
elements, and four of the eight actually tried to construct iterative processes. The 
processes were of two types: to each step n, either the subject assigned all 
subsets of cardinality n , or the subject constructed the power set { }( )nP ,...,2,1 . 
For either case, one only obtains the finite elements of )(NP . Each subject 
realized this,  but  none could make further progress. All of their attempts, at 
least in terms of the transition from finite to infinite iteration, could be 
interpreted either by APOS Theory, or the Basic Metaphor of Infinity.  
An important finding is that our subjects did not appear to reconceptualize 
resultant states metaphorically. For the set N , the subjects applied actions to 
iterative processes. This supports research conducted by Brown et al. (in press), 
who discovered that their students needed to apply actions to iterative processes 
in order to correctly construct resultant states. Various reviewers (e.g, Dubinsky, 
1999; Gold, 2001; Madden, 2001) have objected to some of the metaphors 
Lakoff and Núñez use to explain mathematical thinking. Schiralli and Sinclair 
(2003) concur. They explain that Lakoff and Núñez’ method of mathematical 
idea analysis supplies plausible, humanistic explanations for the origin of 
conventional  mathematical  ideas but is insufficient  to describe  the formation 
of personal conceptions that constitute the realm of ideational mathematics, the 
realm of individual mental structures that individuals form to understand 
mathematical concepts. Our findings support this claim. However, this does not 
mean that our subjects did not give evidence of metaphorical thinking. Their 
attempts to construct )(NP  iteratively reflected a tendency to reconceptualize 
uncountable entities as countable ones. This supports Lakoff and Núñez’ 
assertion that human beings tend to think of infinite entities, even continuous 
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ones, as repeated processes. From Tall’s (1992) perspective, iteration may be a 
cognitive root for the mental development of uncountable structures, or, to use 
the language of this report, a source for the construction of mental structures for 
)(NP . 
In the case of APOS Theory, mental construction of )(NP , as with any 
mathematical entity, requires an appropriate process mental structure and a 
desired action on that process that will lead to encapsulation and construction of 
)(NP  as the transcendent object. In the case of one aspect of countable infinity, 
infinite iterative processes, that question has been addressed by prior research. 
Brown et al. (in press) offered an empirically-based, APOS theoretical 
description of the mental construction of infinite iterative processes and their 
states at infinity. The authors describe how individuals use the mental 
mechanisms of interiorization and coordination to construct an iterative process, 
and detail how the mechanism of encapsulation leads to the mental construction 
of the state at infinity, which is conceived as a transcendent object. Whether 
APOS Theory can  be extended to  describe  the  cognition  of  problem    
solving situations involving uncountable infinity remains an open question 
requiring further empirical research. However, the subjects’ tendencies to 
construct iterative processes to build a mental structure for )(NP , although not 
successful, could be a starting point. In our future research, we will analyze the 
iterative constructions that seemed natural to our subjects and try to find ways of 
enhancing them so that they do lead to a process whose encapsulation will be 
)(NP . The problem is to find the steps that will pass beyond the finite subsets 
of N  to include infinite subsets. One promising direction we will explore is to 
look at the various Computer Science algorithms for traversing trees. Although 
these are all designed for finite trees, one or more of them might have useful 
extensions to a process for an infinite tree. 
As we search for a process whose encapsulation is )(NP , we will continue 
to observe students  and mathematicians  to see if our sample is typical or if 
there are mental processes appropriate for )(NP  in the minds of mathematicians 
and students. We will consider that an individual has a mental structure for 
)(NP  when he or she can give an explanation of this set that goes beyond its 
formal definition, or explain the meaning of “all” in terms other than synonyms.  
We will also be able to observe a mental structure (or lack thereof) when an 
individual is working  with mathematical situations that involve )(NP  such as 
in proving that it is uncountable, or showing it has the same cardinality as the set 
of real numbers. 
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This study also raised the question of the general applicability of 
constructivism. As  constructivists  ourselves,  we  believe  that  individuals 
build mental structures to  make  sense of mathematical situations. This study 
has not changed our belief, but it does raise the question of whether certain 
mathematical concepts defy a constructivist interpretation. Even when faced 
with pure formalism, Dubinsky (2000) argues that individuals make certain 
mental constructions to make sense of purely formal notions. Our subjects made 
such attempts for )(NP , but no one was  successful. Thus, the results of this 
study cast some doubt on the claim made by Dubinsky (2000). Only further 
empirical research can determine whether this is in fact the case.  
For some concepts, those principally studied by research mathematicians, 
determination of underlying mental structures may not be as crucial. For the set 
)(NP  though, the situation is different because it is a topic of study in the 
undergraduate curriculum. If the most that a mathematician can communicate to 
her or his students about the meaning of )(NP  is that it consists of all subsets of 
N , without further elaboration of the meaning of “all,” then it is hard to see how 
students can develop conceptions of uncountable sets such as )(NP  that go 
beyond empty formalism. As we indicated in the Introduction, Burton (2001) 
notes that current disillusionment with mathematics teaching arises from a lack 
of meaningful explanations. We agree and note that in order to provide such 
explanations for infinite sets, the teacher, indeed the mathematical professional, 
needs to identify or develop meaningful connections for countable and 
uncountable sets. While this may have been done for the former, this report 
shows that this has not yet been accomplished for the latter. 
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